Utility ratemaking comprises three distinct parts: revenue requirements, cost allocation and rate design. Ratemaking is a regulator’s prime function, as it determines how much revenue that utilities should collect from customers, from which customers and how.
The ratemaking process is complex and interactive, striving to satisfy or appease groups with diverse goals, interests and agendas. It also entails addressing the several objectives underlying ratemaking, each of which has a distinct effect on the public interest.
Most utility regulators subscribe to what regulatory observers call the “balancing act” of regulation. In an ideal world, regulators attempt to balance the interests of the different stakeholders with the overall goal of promoting the general good. This objective complies with the premise behind the public-interest theory of regulation. While ratemaking plays an integral role in achieving the “balancing act,” this action has become increasingly difficult for regulators as they have to cope with new interests.
Examples abound in which a particular rate mechanism advances some regulatory objectives while hindering others. The reality is that all rate mechanisms have mixed effects on the public interest. The premise is that when a rate mechanism impedes some regulatory objective it diminishes the public interest, while improving the public interest when it advances an objective. This speaks to the trade-offs regulators must make when deciding on different rate mechanisms.
One example is real-time pricing in which the trade-off is between economic efficiency and price stability. A second example is price caps in which the regulator must weigh the benefits of pricing flexibility and increased incentives for productive efficiency against profit variability, which could lead to “excessive” utility profits. These conflicts inevitably require regulators to make value judgments on the overall desirability of a rate mechanism for the general public.
A third example is cost trackers or riders, in which a trade-off exists between timely utility recovery of costs and robust incentives. Trackers and riders allow utilities to recover their costs more quickly and with more certainty, lowering their financial risk; but they also can create incentive problems when: (1) regulators fail to adequately scrutinize those costs, and (2) cost recovery methods differ across different utility functional areas.
A Risk of Drifting Away from Core Objectives
Today, clean energy, low-income and climate advocates add to the interests that regulators must appease. If regulators try to satisfy more interests, driven by politics or for other reasons, one must ask: Do they therefore risk drifting away from their resolve to achieve core objectives, especially advancing the well-being of utility customers? After all, the raison d’etre for public utility regulation is to protect customers from “monopoly” utilities.
What are these other responsibilities that regulators have to take on? The landscape confronting utility regulators requires them to address a wider array of social issues that historically were under the purview of the other branches of government or left to the marketplace.
Their ratemaking duties include consideration of affordability for low-income households, the accommodation and even the subsidization of new technologies that compete with utilities’ core business, decarbonization of utilities’ generation portfolio, and the subsidization of utilities’ customers to use less electricity and switch to other electricity sources (e.g., rooftop solar).
No other private business comes to mind in which society compels private firms to tackle such a wide array of social issues. It is legitimate to ask whether utility regulation has expanded its domain far beyond its original mandate and what is socially optimal.
What Happens When Ratemaking Goes Astray
Faulty ratemaking can lead to adverse outcomes, like undue price discrimination, inequity, poor incentives for innovation, economic inefficiencies like uneconomic bypass, misallocation of business risk between customers and shareholders, and financially stressed utilities.
Concerning uneconomic bypass, faulty ratemaking can lead to customers choosing providers that have lower prices but higher costs. A regulated utility with an unregulated affiliate might have an incentive to subsidize the affiliate by shifting some of the affiliate’s costs to its core customers (e.g., residential customers).
Good ratemaking always has been a big challenge for regulators. It demands both sound analytics and judgment by regulators. Regulators must weigh or prioritize those objectives underlying ratemaking and measure (if possible) the effect of a rate mechanism on each one, as well as on the overall public interest. Assigning weights requires judgment by regulators, while examining the effect demands data and other unbiased information. Although ratemaking is both an art and a science (some compare it to sausage making), it should start with a strong foundation that includes specified objectives and underlying economic principles, like cost causation.
Utility Regulators Know How to Adapt
Developments in the electric industry have required regulators to re-examine their current, longstanding ratemaking practices. Previous experiences show that utility regulators do adapt, although gradually, to a changed economic, technological and political environment by throwing their support to new rate designs and ratemaking mechanisms.
One example is the restructuring of the U.S. electric industry, starting in the 1970s, triggered by the discontent of consumer groups (especially industrial customers) from continuous rising electricity rates along with the problems encountered by utilities in getting the regulators to approve pass-throughs of costs, even those prudently incurred but second-guessed because of unexpected circumstances.
Utilities could not incorporate these costs (to a large extent beyond their control) into their rates fast enough to keep their earnings from falling to a critical level. Regulators eventually allowed fuel adjustment clauses (and, to a lesser extent, future test years) to reduce regulatory lag and avert more serious financial difficulties. Regulators also revisited existing rate structures (e.g., declining block rates) to determine whether they satisfied new objectives, like the advancement of energy efficiency and the reduction of carbon emissions.
As its central duty, utility regulation should make well-informed decisions driven toward the public interest. It should strive for balance and fairness. Good regulation weighs legitimate interests and makes decisions based on facts. Regulation decisions should not unduly favor any one interest group over the public interest; they should coincide with the law and the evidentiary record. This idea is especially critical today where good ratemaking has become more important, but harder to achieve.
Kenneth W. Costello is a regulatory economist and independent consultant who resides in Santa Fe, N.M.
