PJM had a big day Jan. 16.
The governors of states in the RTO’s territory met at the White House to discuss the flailing market; the administration’s Energy Dominance Council released a fact sheet on bringing big power plants back to solve PJM’s generation problems and a statement of principles urging it to make tariff revisions to right the ship; and the RTO’s Board of Managers released a letter directing its staff to make operational and market modifications, including revising its methods of load forecasting, instituting a reliability auction and forming a Bring Your Own New Generation (BYONG) plan for large load customers.
The series of overlapping and likely coordinated actions has been received well by the energy community. And yet, what are being proposed are merely ideas. As Commissioner David LaCerte commented at FERC’s open meeting Jan 22: “These issues raised in these announcements will make their way to FERC soon.” Translation: We’re still talking about solving problems, not actually solving them.
So if we’re still in the planning phase, policymakers would be wise to look beyond PJM to find successful examples of the mutually beneficial outcomes everyone wants: American energy dominance, industrial competitiveness and customer protection.
Vertically integrated utilities have been doing this successfully for more than a century. In regions like the Southeast, this electric industry structure — where utilities own generation, transmission and distribution — is shielding customers from price spikes while supporting economic growth.
The data overwhelmingly support the vertically integrated model. On average, based on 2024 prices, residential customers in “deregulated” states paid 42% more for electricity than residential customers in states with vertically integrated utilities. Excluding Alaska and Hawaii — outlier states with unique geographic considerations — eight of the 10 most expensive states for electricity have a “competitive” structure.
Competition’s promise was lower prices, right? The hard data show that this promise has failed, costing residential customers billions. For example, in Illinois, a national consumer group has found that electric customers have paid $2 billion more for electric “choice” than they would have with the default utility.
The success of the vertically integrated utility isn’t by chance. And it isn’t monopoly power run amok. Rather, the vertically integrated utility model exists to serve the public interest and place the customer front and center. When Congress passed the Federal Power Act, it chose this approach because electricity requires massive infrastructure investment and therefore demands a different framework. We don’t need to imagine what thousands of wires individually bringing power to homes would look like because we see that in some parts of the world, and that is the way power was delivered in New York City in the late 19th century.
The primary operating principle of the vertically integrated utility is an obligation to serve all customers. These utilities are required to conduct extensive long-term planning where supply and demand must be balanced over decades and the procurement of resources must be the best combination of least cost and least risk. None of these actions or plans can move forward without oversight and approval by state regulators, who hold the dual objectives of supporting state-based growth and ensuring electric rates are fair, reflect actual costs and are allocated fairly across all customers. This relationship between utilities and their regulators is the original public-private partnership — and it doesn’t just work for electricity; it’s also a successful model for water, sewer and gas heating.
Yet, despite a century of success and recent data affirming that customers win under the vertically integrated model, some believers in “competition” continue to make the case for expanding it throughout the electric sector, including pushing for open solicitations for transmission projects. But the data are clear there too, and the pattern repeats: “Competitive” transmission delivers the same disappointing results as “competitive” electricity markets.
Consider what “competitive transmission” actually means. Planning entities determine which transmission projects are needed before any competition begins. Developers (the ones supposedly competing) merely bid to see who builds projects, not on identifying needs or providing ongoing competitive service. Indeed, competitive transmission operators have been fighting for years to be treated like regulated utilities when it comes to prices. Moreover, their so-called competitive bids routinely fail to translate into actual customer savings, proving the theory wrong.
A revealing example comes from New York in 2022, where a “competitive” bid came in 22% lower than the local utility’s proposal. Advocates of competitive transmission celebrated this as proof that competition in transmission can work. But the developer encountered cost overruns of about $74 million above its cost cap because of regulatory delays, transmission line rerouting, tree clearing and wetland mitigation. Tellingly, the original bid failed to account for these costs — whether through strategic omission to win the contract or unfamiliarity with local terrain and regulatory requirements. Ultimately, this project’s cost reached $249 million, up 38% from the winning bid and exceeding what the experienced local utility would have charged.
These stark examples of “competition” failures are particularly important now, as many state legislative sessions resumed at the start of the year and legislators are feeling pressure to find solutions to rising energy costs. Perennial bill proposals on energy often include doubling down on market structures, deregulation and pushes for retail or industrial “choice.” But these options can be best described as “competition for competition’s sake.”
Today’s policymakers should ask a simpler question for finding energy solutions: “What approach best serves customers?” The answer is clear: Well-regulated, vertically integrated utilities have a proven track record of protecting customers.
Electric utilities overseen by smart regulators provide the actual benefits that “competition” is supposed to deliver — downward pressure on prices, accountability for performance and incentives for efficiency — but with additional protections that markets cannot provide, including mandatory service obligations, reliability requirements, and protection from price volatility and market manipulation.
Regulators disallow cost recovery for imprudent investments, enforce lowest reasonable cost standards, and ensure balanced consideration of customer and shareholder interests. These are not theoretical benefits; they are demonstrated outcomes from a century of sound regulatory practice. We have examples of success popping up across the country, where vertically integrated utilities are recruiting data centers and advanced manufacturing with fair electricity rates that don’t harm small customers and average citizens.
The choice facing policymakers is straightforward: proven regulatory approaches that prioritize customers, or continued experimentation with “competitive models” that have repeatedly failed to deliver on their promises. After a century of evidence and recent high-profile market failures, the answer should be clear.
Alison Williams is senior vice president of Power for Tomorrow, a nonprofit that provides practical research, commentary and information regarding how the regulated electric utility model protects consumers and promotes consumer benefits.

